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In this article, Prof. Knake reviews the ten cases related to the role 
of attorneys and the practice of law scheduled to be argued before the 
Supreme Court during the October 2009 term. This term marks a high-
water mark in the number of professional responsibility cases that will 
be heard before the Court, and Prof. Knake surveys the cases to gain 
insights into the Court’s increased interest in questions that address the 
role of attorneys. Prof. Knake posits that the unprecedented number of 
professional responsibility cases, when considered together, signal the 
Court’s significant prioritization of concerns related to the roles and 
obligations of attorneys.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 term features an 
unprecedented number of cases addressing fundamental aspects of 
professional responsibility and regulation of the legal profession. At 
the time of this writing, the Court has granted petitions for certiorari 
in ten cases related to the role of attorneys and the practice of law. 
This body of cases represents a significant departure from dockets in 
recent history, where typically the Court has considered no more than 
two or three matters involving the ethical obligations and legal duties 
of attorneys (and at times none).1 
The questions presented in these cases will force the Court to 
confront the following issues: the First Amendment rights of attorneys 
to give advice and to advertise; the standards for finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel when an attorney gives faulty advice, employs 
questionable trial strategy, lacks the requisite experience, or misses a 
critical filing deadline; the right to an immediate appeal of challenged 
attorney-client privilege waivers; the calculation of attorney fees 
awarded under fee-shifting statutes as well as whether an attorney 
holds a property right in such an award; and the extent to which a 
prosecuting attorney may be liable for civil damages for procuring 
false testimony and introducing it at trial. The cases are surveyed 
below in an effort to gain insights into the Court’s increased interest 
in questions that address the role of attorneys. 
This essay argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to devote 
over ten percent2 of its time during the 2009-2010 term to matters 
 
 1. In a typical term the Supreme Court hears three or fewer such cases at most, and 
sometimes none. See infra notes155–158and accompanying text. 
2. To date, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to sixty-two cases, ten (or 16%) of 
which include issues centrally related to the law of lawyering.  The Court may very well add 
more cases before the term ends. Even if it does not, these ten cases will represent over 10% of 
the Court’s agenda assuming that it grants review to a total of approximately 80-85 cases (during 
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involving the law of lawyering is noteworthy not only for the 
individual issues to be resolved but also for the cases’ existence, 
indeed dominance, on the docket. The law of lawyering is an oft-
ignored but vitally important field necessary for ensuring the proper 
function of our justice system and our democratic form of 
government. The outcomes of these cases have the potential to impact 
the work of many attorneys in meaningful ways and, when considered 
together, signal the Court’s significant prioritization of concerns 
related to the roles and obligations of attorneys.   
 
II. A PREVIEW OF THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CASES ON 
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2009–2010 DOCKET 
A. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States: Attorney 
Advice and Advertising 
One of the more important issues facing the Court this term 
focuses on the First Amendment protection that attorney advice and 
advertising deserves, albeit in a rather unlikely context: a 
constitutional challenge to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).3 On its surface 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al. v. United States4 appears to be 
about prevention of bankruptcy abuses,5 yet the more consequential 
considerations are whether Congress can place limits on otherwise 
lawful legal advice and compel certain disclosures in attorney 
advertisements.6 
Some explanation of the BAPCPA is necessary to understand how 
the Court may resolve this appeal. Congress enacted the BAPCPA 
after considering eight years of testimony and reports on the 
pervasive and increasing problems of fraud within the bankruptcy 
system.7 The BAPCPA targeted both debtors and attorneys who 
 
the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 terms the Court granted review to 78 and 87 cases, respectively). 
3 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C., and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 4. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. 
granted 129 S. Ct. 2766 (2009), consolidated with United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 
P.A., 129 S. Ct. 2769 (2009).  
5. Milavetz, 541 F.3d 785. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of 
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 688–89 (2008) (providing detail on BAPCPA’s 
origins). 
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engaged or appeared to engage in abusive practices. 
The BAPCPA includes regulations applicable not only to debtors, 
but also to “debt relief agencies,” a term that has been construed by a 
majority of courts, including the Eighth Circuit in Milavetz, to 
encompass attorneys.8 These regulations include a prohibition on 
certain advice offered by an attorney to a debtor-client regarding the 
accumulation of additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy,9 and 
a mandatory inclusion of the following disclosure in advertising by an 
attorney who offers bankruptcy-related advice: “We are a debt relief 
agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code.”10 
Shortly after the enactment of the BAPCPA, the Milavetz 
plaintiffs—two attorneys, their law firm, and two clients—filed a 
lawsuit against the federal government. They challenged the 
application of the debt relief agency classification to attorneys, as well 
as the advice prohibition and the mandatory advertising disclosures. 
The Eighth Circuit ultimately struck down the advice prohibition but 
upheld the advertising disclosures. Both sides appealed. 
At a time when attorney regulation has come under intense 
scrutiny, particularly in the areas of finance and bankruptcy given the 
recent economic tumult, this case has weighty repercussions for 
clients who need complete legal advice about bankruptcy and for 
their attorneys who are under ethical obligations to deliver that 
guidance. The regulations run counter to an attorney’s established 
ethical duties under the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct to “provide competent 
representation”11 and “render candid advice,”12 as well as “not make a 
false or misleading communication about the . . . lawyer’s services.”13 
Should the Supreme Court declare the challenged regulations 
 
 8. The BAPCPA defines the term “debt relief agency” as “any person who provides any 
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other 
valuable consideration . . . ” 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12A) (West Supp. 2009). 
 9. The BAPCPA provides in pertinent part that “[a] debt relief agency shall not—advise 
an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such 
person filing [for bankruptcy].” 11 U.S.C.A. § 526(a)(4). 
 10. The BAPCPA requires the disclosure (or something substantially similar) in any 
advertisement for “bankruptcy assistance services” or referencing “the benefits of bankruptcy” 
or any advertisement regarding “assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage 
foreclosures, eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay 
any consumer debt.” 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 528(a)(3), (4); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 528(b)(2)(A), (B). 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (2009). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 2.1. 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1;  see also MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 
7.1  (adopting Model Rule 7.1). 
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constitutional, this case could detrimentally affect the ability of 
attorneys to provide complete advice and advertising free of 
arguably-inaccurate disclaimers not only in bankruptcy practice but 
also in other areas of law.14 A number of the cases before the Court 
this term raise similar concerns about the rights and obligations of the 
attorney together with those of the client. 
B. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Attorney Advice Again 
A second federal statute limiting the guidance that attorneys may 
give to their clients is challenged in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project.15 While this case touches on a range of concerns well beyond 
the law of lawyering, certain provisions before the Court apply 
directly to the advice a lawyer may give to clients. The Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act16 and its amendment, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,17 criminalize 
“expert advice or assistance” 18 given to any group designated as “a 
foreign terrorist organization”19 even if such support is for nonviolent 
activities or humanitarian efforts.20 “Expert advice or assistance” is 
defined as “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”21 
This prohibition was challenged by the Humanitarian Law Project, 
among others, which sought to provide support to the Kurdistan 
Workers Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for 
nonviolent and lawful peace-making activities. This support included 
“offer[ing] their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements.”22 
The Ninth Circuit held that the “other specialized knowledge” 
 
 14. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., A Debt-Defying Act: Courts say part of embattled 
bankruptcy law violates First Amendment, J. AMER. BAR ASS’N. (Jan. 2009) (quoting Joseph R. 
Prochaska, immediate-past chair of the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee in the ABA Section 
of Business Law, as stating that“[t]his could have a spillover outside the bankruptcy context. . . . 
For example, Congress could apply the same rationale to the tax arena and start to regulate the 
content of advice that tax attorneys give to clients about lawful ways to minimize tax 
liabilities.”). 
 15. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Sept. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1574134, 
consolidated with Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, ___S. Ct. ___ (Sept. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 
2189681. 
16. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
17. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
18. 18 U.S.C.A § 2339A(b)(3) (West Supp. 2009). 
19. 8 U.S.C.A § 1189 (West 2005). 
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a). 
21. § 2339A(b)(3). 
22. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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portion of the prohibition on “expert advice or assistance” language 
was void for vagueness as applied because it “cover[s] constitutionally 
protected advocacy.”23 The court justified its position by reasoning 
that the “requirement for clarity is enhanced when criminal sanctions 
are at issue or when the statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic 
First Amendment freedoms.”24  
In petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Attorney General 
Holder argued that the provisions are not vague and, “[i]n any event . 
. . regulate[] conduct, not speech, and do[] not violate the First 
Amendment.”25 In opposition, the Humanitarian Law Group 
countered that the “‘expert advice’ provisions criminalize speech on 
the basis of its content,” and argued that the Ninth Circuit’s 
determination should be affirmed.26  
As in Milavetz, the Supreme Court’s treatment of this federal 
statutory constraint on attorney advice may have significant 
ramifications for lawyers and clients. A third case also bears on this 
issue, questioning the impact of a client’s reliance on bad advice.      
C. Padilla v. Kentucky: Attorney Misadvice 
Padilla v. Kentucky27 involves a Sixth Amendment ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim brought by a legal permanent resident 
whose attorney incorrectly advised him that pleading guilty to three 
drug-related charges would not result in deportation.28 Padilla 
presents two closely related questions. First, does an attorney have an 
affirmative duty to advise a non-citizen client that pleading guilty to 
an offense will result in deportation, or is this a “collateral 
consequence” that would relieve the attorney of such a duty?29 
Second, if deportation is a collateral consequence, does an attorney’s 
misadvice that the guilty plea will not result in deportation constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel?30 
A brief history of this case provides context for the questions 
 
23. Id. at 930. 
24. Id. at 928 (quoting Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 
928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)).  
25. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-1498 
(U.S. June 4, 2009). 
26. Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-
1498 (U.S. July 6, 2009). 
 27. Padilla v. Kentucky, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009). 
 28. Id. at 483. 
 29. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009). 
30.    Id. 
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presented. The petitioner, Jose Padilla, had lived in the United States 
over forty years (and served in the U.S. military during the Vietnam 
War) when he was indicted in 2001 on three drug counts related to the 
trafficking and possession of marijuana and for failing to have an 
appropriate tax number on the truck he was driving.31 Padilla 
conferred with his attorney about how to respond to the charges, 
asking specifically about the consequences of a guilty plea.32 After his 
attorney reassured him that he “did not have to worry about 
immigration status since he had been in the country so long,”33 Padilla 
pleaded guilty to the drug charges and the other charge was 
dropped.34 
The advice from Padilla’s attorney was wrong. Two federal 
statutes related to antiterrorism and illegal immigration reform 
enacted in 1996 made Padilla’s crime an “aggravated felony” under 
the Immigration and Nationalization Act, triggering mandatory 
deportation following a guilty plea.35 Padilla sought post-conviction 
relief arguing that his attorney’s misadvice about the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.36 A divided Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s 
request for relief based upon his attorney’s misadvice, holding that 
mandatory deportation is a “collateral consequence[] . . . outside the 
scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”37 
Like Milavetz and Holder, Padilla raises critical questions about a 
lawyer’s obligation and ability to provide accurate and complete 
advice to a client as well as a lawyer’s duty of competence. For 
example, as previously discussed, the ABA Model Rules mandate that 
attorneys provide competent representation to a client, which 
includes “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”38 As the ABA set forth 
in its amicus curiae brief in support of Padilla, “under the ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards, a lawyer’s duty of competence includes 
the duty to be informed about the consequences of a client’s guilty 
 
 31. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Brief of Petitioner at 5–7, supra note 29 (citing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b) (West 2005)). 
 36. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 37. Id. at 485. 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (2009). See also KY. SCR 3.130(1.1) 
(adopting Model Rule 1.1). 
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plea, and to advise the client accordingly.”39 Furthermore, the ABA 
Standards specifically “provide that a lawyer should advise a non-
citizen client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea 
because they will frequently be of critical importance to the client.”40 
Though Milavetz, Holder, and Padilla involve different rights and 
protections, bankruptcy debtors, humanitarian workers, and criminal 
defendants all face harsh consequences from incomplete or wrong 
advice from their attorneys. To the extent the Court favors the 
arguments in Milavetz and Holder that the First Amendment protects 
attorney advice from federal statutory constraints, the Court should 
likewise rule here that Padilla’s plea cannot stand given counsel’s 
misadvice. Another case on the Court’s docket, Wood v. Allen, 
identifies comparable concerns for clients in a different context: an 
attorney’s insufficient experience. 
D. Wood v. Allen: Attorney Inexperience 
Wood v. Allen41 presents an issue certain to resonate with law 
students and newly practicing lawyers, as well as with the more senior 
attorneys who train and supervise them. The case concerns the degree 
to which an attorney’s inexperience plays a role in an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The case originates from a challenge to 
the sentence received by the petitioner, Holly Wood, “a black man 
with an IQ less than 70. . . . [who was] sentenced to death for a capital 
murder.”42 During the penalty phase of the trial, Wood “was 
represented by Kenneth Trotter, a recently-admitted lawyer who 
lacked any criminal law experience.”43 Though two more experienced 
trial counsel worked on the case, (and Alabama law at the time 
required attorneys appointed to capital murder cases to have at 
minimum five years of experience in criminal law),44 the sentencing 
process fell to Trotter alone.45 Wood argued that Trotter’s efforts were 
“woefully inadequate” and that “[d]espite . . . clear evidence of mental 
impairments, neither Trotter nor either of his co-counsel pursued that 
 
 39. Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–6, 
Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009) (citing relevant ABA Model Rules and 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function). 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389 (2009). 
 42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Wood v. Allen, No. 08-9156 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2009) 
(citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 3, n.1 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (1994)). 
 45. Id. at 3. 
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evidence as a mitigating factor.”46 
Applying the Strickland v. Washington47 test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel—that counsel’s performance was deficient and 
that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant—a divided panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected Wood’s argument.48 Untroubled by Trotter’s 
lack of experience, the majority instead focused on the fact that two 
other experienced attorneys also worked on the case. In dissent, 
however, Judge Barkett lamented what she described as “egregious 
failures of Wood’s defense counsel to investigate and develop 
available mitigating evidence for the penalty phase,” failures that 
“epitomize[d] the sort of deficient performance that an ineffective 
assistance claim exists to guard against.”49 
Devoting over twenty pages solely to the issue of whether 
Trotter’s inexperience caused ineffective counsel, the dissent noted 
several concerns. Trotter had been practicing law for less than six 
months and conveyed his nervousness about handling the case, yet 
received primary responsibility for the penalty phase of the trial.50 He 
“expressed his frustration at the lack of supervision and guidance he 
was receiving in a letter to . . . the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
stating, ‘I have been stressed out over this case and don’t have anyone 
with whom to discuss the case, including the two other attorneys.’”51  
The dissent observed that “[h]e realized too late what any reasonably 
prepared attorney would have known: that evidence of Wood’s mental 
impairments could have served as mitigating evidence and deserved 
investigation so that it could properly be presented before 
sentencing.”52 Thus, the dissent concluded, “[d]ue to Trotter’s 
inexperience, and [the two senior attorneys’] lack of participation in 
preparation for the penalty phase, no investigation of Wood’s mental 
retardation was conducted at all, and that alone is the reason it was 
never presented to the jury in mitigation.”53 The dissent also agreed 
with the district court that this ineffectiveness prejudiced Wood.54 
 
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 48. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389 
(2009) (holding that failure to present evidence of Wood’s mental retardation did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 49. Id. at 1315 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 1316 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 1318 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1322 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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A reversal by the Supreme Court would have a range of 
implications for inexperienced lawyers and their supervising 
attorneys. It would signal the seriousness of attorneys’ ethical and 
professional obligations to seek assistance when necessary55 and to 
provide appropriate supervision of junior attorneys.56 This appeal also 
indirectly implicates an evolving debate among legal educators on the 
training and preparation that law students receive prior to entering 
law practice. Similarly, the Wood case intersects with Milavetz and 
Padilla in raising questions about minimum levels of competence that 
a client can expect from an attorney. Here, however, the primary issue 
is the lawyer’s strategy, or means employed to pursue the client’s 
objectives, rather than the giving of advice. 
Unlike the advice cases, where it is clear whether an attorney has 
offered prohibited or incorrect advice, inexperience is not easily 
defined. As the ABA Model Rules explain, “[a] lawyer need not 
necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal 
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly 
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long 
experience.”57 The most difficult aspect of this case for the Court will 
be drawing the line as to when, if ever, the inexperience of an attorney 
translates into ineffective assistance of counsel.  
E. Holland v. Florida: Attorney Negligence 
 
An attorney’s duties of competence, diligence, and communication 
all are at issue in Holland v. Florida58, another ineffective assistance of 
counsel case. This matter involves a death row inmate’s late-filed 
federal habeas appeal. Though Holland, the inmate, repeatedly 
contacted his court-appointed attorney about filing his habeas 
petition,59 his attorney missed the filing date.  
 
 55. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (“In determining 
whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant 
factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general 
experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and 
study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or 
associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.”). 
 56. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 5.1 (addressing “responsibilities of 
partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers”). 
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 cmt. 2. 
 58. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Oct. 13, 
2009), 2009 WL 2134374. 
59. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1337. 
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Holland then proceeded pro se, filing the petition on his own and 
requesting equitable tolling, or an extension, of the deadline based 
upon his attorney’s “gross negligence.”60 The statute of limitations to 
file a federal habeas corpus petition provides for equitable tolling 
when two standards are met. First, the petitioner must show he 
diligently pursued his rights. Second, he must show that “some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely 
filing.”61   
The Eleventh Circuit held that “[p]ure professional negligence” 
was not enough to qualify for equitable tolling.62 While the court 
assumed that the attorney’s failure to file a federal habeas petition 
“despite [Holland’s] repeated instructions to do so”63 constituted 
gross negligence, it determined that “no allegation of lawyer 
negligence or of failure to meet a lawyer’s standard of care . . . can rise 
to the level of egregious attorney misconduct that would entitle 
[Holland] to equitable tolling.”64 
In his Supreme Court appeal, Holland took issue with “[t]he 
Eleventh Circuit’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge that ‘gross 
negligence’ is sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”65 He contended 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s test conflicts with other circuits and 
establishes a “near-impossible standard to meet.”66 In the opposition 
brief, Florida suggested that Holland’s own behavior, including not 
answering “at least eight letters” written by his attorney, should be 
taken into account, and further argued that equitable tolling is not 
warranted in this case because Holland’s attorney’s failure to file a 
timely federal habeas petition “was merely ordinary attorney 
negligence.”67  
Like many of the lawyering cases before the Court this term, 
Holland implicates important duties owed by a lawyer to the client. 
For example, the ABA Model Rules demand minimum levels of 
diligence68 and communication. 69 A lawyer also is required under the 
 
60. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 4–5, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. May 13, 
2009). 
61. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 548 U.S. 
408, 418 (2005)). 
62. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1339. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at 7. 
66. Id. at 7–8. 
67. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 13, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. Sept. 11, 
2009). 
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 (2009)(“A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
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Model Rules to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation” and must “consult with the client as to 
the means by which they are to be pursued.”70 While the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to “constitutionalize”71 standards of 
professional conduct, it has looked to the Model Rules for evaluating 
attorney behavior in evaluating the Sixth Amendment right of a 
criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel,72 and may do so 
in Holland and the other ineffective assistance of counsel cases as 
well.      
F. Smith v. Spisak: Attorney Loyalty and Strategy 
Smith v. Spisak73 presents yet another claim of constitutionally 
ineffective lawyering, this time based upon a lawyer’s trial strategy at 
closing argument. Defendant Spisak was convicted in 1983 of four 
murders at Cleveland State University.74 He pled not guilty by reason 
of insanity, but admitted to the murders.75 During the trial he claimed 
to be a follower of Adolf Hitler.76 Though a number of experts were 
prepared to testify about Spisak’s mental illness, they were excluded 
from supporting his insanity claim.77 
In the closing argument of the sentencing phase, Spisak’s attorney 
“repeatedly stress[ed] the brutality of the crimes and demean[ed] 
[Spisak].”78 He described each murder in graphic detail, made little 
mention of Spisak’s mental illness, and “rambl[ed] incoherently . . . 
 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
mirror the relevant obligations of the ABA Model Rules. See FLORIDA RULES REGULATING 
THE BAR, R. 4-1.1, R. 4-1.2, R. 4-1.3, R. 4-1.4 (2009). 
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.4(a)(3),(4) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter [and] promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information.”).  
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.2. 
71. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165(1986). Nix looked to the Model Rules for guidance 
but cautioned that “[w]hen examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow 
the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to 
consitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct.” Id. 
72. Id.  
 73. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. granted and case remanded, 
Hudson v. Spisak, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), on remand, Spisak v. Hudson, 512 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 
2008), reh’ng en banc denied, 512 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Smith v. Spisak, 129 S. 
Ct. 1319 (2009). 
74. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688–90 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting State v. Spisak, 521 
N.E.2d 800, 800–01 (1988)), 
75. Id. at 688, 690. 
76. Id. at 688. 
77. Id. at 691-703. 
78. Id. at 705. 
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about integrity in the legal system.”79 The district court found the 
argument to be “an appropriate part of trial counsel’s strategy to 
confront the heinousness of the murders before the prosecution had 
the opportunity to do so.”80 The Sixth Circuit disagreed. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “in pursuing this 
course, [Spisak’s attorney] abandoned the duty of loyalty owed to [his 
client].”81 The court was particularly concerned that the attorney’s 
“hostility toward [Spisak] aligned [him] with the prosecution against 
his own client.”82 Furthermore, the court observed, “[m]uch of 
[Spisak’s attorney’s] argument during the closing of mitigation could 
have been made by the prosecution, and if it had, would likely have 
been grounds for a successful prosecutorial misconduct claim.”83 The 
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas.84   
Ohio argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that Spisak’s 
attorney’s closing argument was “reasonable when viewed from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”85 Yet, a group of prominent trial 
advocacy law professors filed an amicus brief reaching the opposite 
conclusion.86 They explained that Spisak’s attorney’s closing argument 
unconstitutionally prejudiced his case, observing that “a closing 
argument that magnifies and obsesses on weaknesses, while discussing 
strengths in an indirect and at times incomprehensible manner, is 
below any reasonable measure of professional competence.” 87 They 
suggested that a holding to the contrary “would teach generations of 
future lawyers incorrect lessons about how to present a case, and 
would leave clients—both Mr. Spisak and future clients in like cases—
without the reasonable assurance of actual assistance of counsel to 
which the Sixth Amendment entitles them.”88 As in the other 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Spisak will address the key elements of a lawyer’s duties and 
obligations to the client, and will determine when, if ever, a failure to 




81. Id. at 706. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
84. Id.  
85. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Smith v. Spisak, No. 08-724 (U.S. May 22, 2009). 
86. Brief of Stephen Lubet et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2–3, Smith v. 
Spisak, No. 08-724 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2009). 
87. Id. at 3. 
88.  Id. 
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G. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter: Attorney-Client Privilege 
 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter89 asks “whether a party has an 
immediate appeal . . . of a district court’s order finding waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege and compelling production of privileged 
materials.”90 But the outcome will impact far more than procedural 
functions. As the petitioner Mohawk argues, an immediate appeal is 
imperative to protecting attorney-client privilege in this situation. 
This case involves an unlawful termination dispute between 
Mohawk Industries and its employee, Norman Carpenter.91 During 
discovery, Carpenter requested information that Mohawk refused to 
provide on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Carpenter moved to 
compel discovery. While the district court agreed that the disputed 
communications were privileged, it concluded that Mohawk “had 
implicitly waived the attorney-client privilege” through a response 
filed in an unrelated action.92 
Mohawk appealed under the collateral order doctrine, which 
provides an exception to the final judgment rule and the 
corresponding principle that “[g]enerally, discovery orders are not 
final orders . . . for purposes of obtaining appellate jurisdiction.”93 
Under this exception, “an order is appealable [only] if it (1) 
conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; 
and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”94 
The Eleventh Circuit found the first two prongs satisfied, but held 
“that a discovery order [implicating] the attorney-client privilege is 
[not] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”95 
Acknowledging a split among the circuits,96 the court suggested that 
mandamus or a challenge to a contempt order following 
noncompliance provide alternative mechanisms for review,97 
 
 89. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc. 541 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. 
granted, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 129 S. Ct. 1041 (2009). 
 90. Reply Brief of Petitioner at i, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678 (U.S. Jan. 
6, 2009), 2009 WL 52074. 
 91. Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1050. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1052 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006)). 
 94. Id. at 1052 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)). 
 95. Id. at 1052. 
 96. See id. at 1053 (citing cases from the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits holding that the 
collateral order doctrine allows review of an order compelling the production of attorney-client 
communication, and cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits 
that it does not). 
 97. See Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1048, 1054–55. 
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notwithstanding the practical difficulties associated with these options 
and the extraordinary costs associated with a new trial.98 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mohawk focused on the 
importance of the attorney-client privilege in the context of the 
justice system—an issue glossed over in the Eleventh Circuit 
opinion.99 Moreover, Mohawk reasoned that if it must “wait until after 
a final judgment to appeal the District Court’s order, the right [it] 
seeks to protect, namely, the right not to disclose privileged 
information, will have been destroyed. It is this right of non-disclosure 
that is at the heart of the attorney-client privilege.”100 Mohawk went 
on to observe: “as the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have recognized, 
an appeal after final judgment cannot remedy the breach of 
confidentiality occasioned by erroneous disclosure of privileged 
material . . . . Once the privileged information is disclosed, there is no 
way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure.”101 
This case strikes at the same concerns about an attorney’s ability 
to advise her client as do the preceding cases of Milavetz, Padilla, and 
Wood addressing attorney advice. The rationale of the attorney-client 
privilege—“the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications known to the common law”—is to “encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law 
and administration of justice.”102 
Without that full and frank communication, an attorney may not 
be able to offer essential advice. Similarly, “corporations may be less 
likely to engage in internal investigations to ensure their compliance 
with the law because the assurance that the legal findings and 
conclusions resulting from such investigations could be maintained in 
confidence would be weakened considerably.”103 When a client is 
forced to produce documents protected by the attorney-client 
 
 98. See, e.g., Michael P. Shea, Allow Prompt Appeals, NAT’L L. J., April 13, 2009 at 23 col. 
1 (explaining that “mandamus—an extraordinary remedy reserved for ‘clear abuses of 
discretion’ by the trial judge—is a poor fit for orders denying privilege claims” and that the 
contempt order for non-compliance “is even worse” in that for most parties “enduring the 
penalties and stigma associated with a contempt sanction is simply not a feasible option”); see 
also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 32–40, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678 (U.S. 
April 27, 2009), 2009 WL 1155404 (discussing problems associated with mandamus and 
contempt). 
 99.  Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 98 at 19. 
100.  Id. at 11–12. 
101.  Id. at 12 (quotation and citations omitted). 
102.  Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
103.  Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 98, at 32-40. 
16 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POL'Y SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:1 
privilege only to learn at a trial’s end that the documents ought not to 
have been revealed, the privilege exists in theory but not in practical 
application. 
Approaching this case from the standpoint of the client’s interests 
offers further justification for the position that an immediate appeal is 
warranted. Such a ruling in the context of protecting attorney-client 
privilege certainly would be consistent with the prioritization of 
protections on attorney advice and the client’s receipt of that advice 
as noted in the prior cases studied in this essay. The next case turns to 
a related concern—access to attorney advice. 
H. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn: Attorney Fees 
At issue in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn104 is when, if ever, “a 
reasonable attorney’s fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute . . . 
[may] be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results 
obtained when these factors already are included in the lodestar 
calculation.”105 This case stems from a Georgia federal district court’s 
award of more than $10.5 million to a group of attorneys who 
represented a class action of 3,000 foster children against the State of 
Georgia.106 Of that award, $4.5 million represented an enhancement to 
the lodestar calculation, based upon the district court’s assessment 
that the quality of legal representation was “far superior to what 
consumers of legal services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta could 
reasonably expect to receive.”107 
A unanimous panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s award, though it did so with serious reservations.108 In 
 
104.  Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel Winn, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’ng en banc denied, 
547 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009). 
105.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Purdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. June 22, 
2009) (emphasis added).  The lodestar formula includes twelve factors for determining an 
appropriate fee:  “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by 
the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount 
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 
(10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”  Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n. 3 
(1983). 
106.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 105 at 4–8. 
107.  Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2006). The 
District Court further observed that “[a]fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, 
the Court is unaware of any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable 
result on such a comprehensive scale.” Id. at 1290. 
108.  Perdue, 532 F.3d at 1236–38. 
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particular, the court observed that the district court’s enhancement 
“cannot be squared with the Supreme Court [precedent],”109 and “that 
the enhancement to the lodestar amount in this case was improper.”110 
Nevertheless, “under the prior panel precedent rule [the court was] 
not free to decide the enhancement issue.”111 As such, though the 
court was “convinced” that the prior Eleventh Circuit precedent “was 
wrong and conflict[ed] with relevant Supreme Court decisions,” it felt 
“bound to follow it”112 and upheld the award. 
In its petition to the Supreme Court, the State argued that the 
results obtained and the quality of work done in a case should be 
considered only when calculating the basic lodestar fee amount.113 In 
other words, it constitutes double-counting to consider those factors 
again in awarding an enhancement, bonus, or other additional 
amount. 
In response, the attorneys seeking enforcement of the fee award 
focused on the district court’s decision and on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
denial of a rehearing en banc. Judge Wilson wrote an opinion 
concurring in the denial and finding that “[s]everal decades of 
established precedent make it clear that district judges are vested with 
discretion to enhance a fee in accordance with a federal-fee shifting 
statute, in the ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ case, when there is specific 
evidence in the record to support an exceptional result and superior 
performance.”114 
There is no question that these factors are appropriate for 
calculating a reasonable lodestar amount; however, that these factors 
should be grounds for a de facto bonus is a conclusion unlikely to be 
reached by a majority of the Supreme Court. This is especially true 
given that the omission of such enhancement would not discourage or 
thwart future representations.115 As with the other cases, professional 
 
109.  Id. at 1225. 
110.  Id. at 1233. 
111.  Id. at 1236 (citing NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987) and 
Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
112.  Id. at 1238 (citing cases including Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“[W]e are not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely because 
we are convinced it is wrong . . . .”)). 
113.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 105 at 13–14. 
114.  Brief in Opposition at 10, Purdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. March 4, 
2009) (quoting 547 F.3d at 1320) (citations omitted). 
115.  In fact, the lawyers in Perdue took on and successfully carried out their representation 
without any expectation of an enhancement. See Marcia Coyle, Advocacy Group to Defend 
Hike in Fee Award, N.Y. L. J., April 13, 2009 at 1 col. 3  (interviewing Marcia Robinson Lowry, 
executive director of Children’s Rights, Inc. (group of lawyers representing plaintiff class in 
Perdue), who explained “that such enhancements were rare, occurring on average only once 
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conduct codes also have a role here. For example, Model Rule 1.5 
reinforces the factors for determining the reasonableness of a fee,116 
and the Model Rules also ensure that “[a]n attorney who accepts a 
case arising under a fee-shifting statue is ethically obligated, as is any 
attorney in any case, to represent her client to the best of her 
ability,”117 regardless of compensation. 
I.  Astrue v. Ratliff: Attorney Fees Again 
Astrue v. Ratliff118 offers a second opportunity for the Court to 
evaluate attorneys’ fees in the context of federal fee-shifting statutes. 
At stake in this case is whether a fee award belongs to the attorney or 
the client. Attorney Catherine Ratliff “successfully represented two 
claimants in their efforts to receive benefits from the Social Security 
Administration.”119 After her victory, she requested payment of her 
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 120 The 
EAJA is a federal fee-shifting statute that allows “prevailing parties” 
in civil actions against the United States to recover fees and other 
costs in certain cases. The district court granted Ratliff’s request, but 
the government reduced her award because of debt that one of her 
clients owed the United States Government.121 Ratliff challenged the 
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that it 
constituted an illegal seizure, but the district court held she lacked 
standing “because the fees were awarded to the parties, not their 
 
each year in the entire federal system. Her own organization ‘has never sought and never 
received an enhancement’ she said in an interview last week”). 
116.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.5(a) (7) (2009) (“The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include . . . the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.”). 
117.  Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Purdue v. Kenny A. 
ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 
1.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client,” which “requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”) and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008) (stating a 
lawyer should “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s 
cause or endeavor” and must “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”)). 
118.  Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Astrue v. Ratliff, ___ S. Ct. 
___ (Sep. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1146426. 
119.  Id. at 801. 
120.  Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412. 
121.  Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801. The amount at issue relates to only one of the clients, a Social 
Security claimant proceeding in forma pauperis. The court awarded Ratliff fees and expenses in 
the amount of $2,239.35, all of which was offset by the government to satisfy the claimant’s pre-
existing federal debt. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 
(U.S. April 28, 2009), 2009 WL 1155415. 
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attorney.”122 
The Eight Circuit reversed, holding that “EAJA attorneys’ fees 
are awarded to the prevailing parties’ attorneys.”123 It did so in the 
face of contradictory precedent from other jurisdictions, notably the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.124 The court noted, however, that the 
result was based upon controlling Eighth Circuit cases and “[w]ere [it] 
deciding this case in the first instance, [it might] well agree with [the] 
sister circuits.”125 
Predictably, in its petition for certiorari, the government argued 
that the Supreme Court should follow those courts holding that fees 
awarded to a prevailing party under the EAJA are property of the 
client, not the attorney.126 Ratliff, for her part, countered that “the 
Eighth Circuit was correct in holding that attorneys are entitled to 
receive EAJA awards in Social Security cases notwithstanding the 
government’s purported offset rights to collect debts owed by 
clients.”127 Further, she noted that the Eighth Circuit’s 
acknowledgement of an attorney’s “protectable property interest in 
an EAJA fee once it is awarded” was a position “find[ing] strong 
support in the long-established rule that an attorney’s interest in a fee 
for her efforts creates a lien allowing equitable tracing of funds that 
have been transferred to other creditors of the client.”128 Thus, it 
follows that “the attorney’s equitable lien is itself a property interest 
subject to constitutional protection against government confiscation,” 
irrespective of “who has the right to apply for an attorney fee . . . or 
even to receive it in the first instance.”129 Ratliff also suggested that 
the consequences of a reversal would leave few attorneys, if any, to 
assist Social Security claimants given that they risk receiving no 
compensation, “even in those cases where they not only succeed, but 
[also] where the government’s position was not . . . justified.”130 
Both Purdue and Astrue stand apart from most of the other cases 
previewed in this essay, as they do not directly address a primary 
function of the attorney-client relationship. Nevertheless, 
compensation guaranteed by a fee-shifting statute undoubtedly 
 
122.  Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801. 
123.  Id. at 802. 
124.  Id. at 801–02 (citing cases). 
125.  Id. at 802. 
126.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 7. 
127.  Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 21, Ratliff,  No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 25, 2009). 
128.  Id. (citations omitted). 
129.  Id. (citations omitted). 
130.  Id. at 29. 
20 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POL'Y SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:1 
influences attorneys to take on representations where parties 
otherwise would be left with no legal advice (and, in cases like Astrue, 
with no assistance in obtaining wrongly-denied benefits). Thus, in an 
important way, the attorney fees cases are interwoven with those 
cases addressing attorney advice and, in particular, the right or ability 
of clients to access necessary legal representation and advice. 
J. Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee: Attorney Immunity 
The final case previewed in this essay demands that the Court 
offer much-needed clarification to the doctrine of prosecutorial 
immunity. Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee131 dates back to 1978 
when two black teenagers, Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington, 
were convicted of murdering a white, retired Council Bluffs police 
department captain.132 Both were sentenced to life imprisonment.133 In 
2002, finding that the prosecutors failed to disclose evidence of an 
alternative suspect and coerced false testimony, the Iowa Supreme 
Court reversed Harrington’s conviction,134 and McGhee was allowed 
to enter a plea to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 
time served.135 
The two men then brought civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983 against Pottawattamie County and the two former county 
prosecutors.136 The prosecutors argued that they were entitled to 
absolute immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman,137 in which the Supreme 
Court held that prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity at trial 
for their prosecutorial acts but only qualified immunity for 
investigatory or administrative acts.138 Imbler did not provide 
definitive guidance, however, as to what differentiates a prosecutorial 
activity from an investigatory or administrative activity.139 The 
McGhee case provides the Court a window to do so; in fact, it offers 
an opportunity for the Court to reconsider Imbler’s holding in its 
entirety. 
The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors 
 
131.  McGee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009). 
132.  547 F.3d at 925. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
138.  Id. at 430–31. 
139.  Id. 
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based on withholding of exculpatory evidence, but denied immunity 
for the claims based on the allegations that the prosecutors had 
coerced false testimony from witnesses that later was introduced at 
trial and resulted in the convictions.140 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.141 
As McGhee and Harrington observed, “[w]ithout the fabricated 
testimony, there was no evidence connecting plaintiffs to the 
murder.”142 
The former prosecutors petitioned the Supreme Court to address 
whether they “may be subjected to a civil trial and potential damages 
for a wrongful conviction and incarceration where [they] allegedly 
violated a criminal defendant’s ‘substantive due process’ rights by 
procuring false testimony during the criminal investigation and then 
introduced that same testimony against the defendant at trial.”143 
Though the former prosecutors were careful to note that they had not 
conceded McGhee and Harrington’s version of the facts,144 they did 
not dispute them in the appeal. Rather, they made two arguments. 
First, they contended that the Eight Circuit’s decision conflicts with 
the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons145 that the 
procurement of false testimony does not violate the Constitution and 
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for the use of such false 
testimony.146 Second, they suggested that the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
conflicts with other Supreme Court precedent, particularly with 
regard to the Court’s “function test” for prosecutorial immunity.147 In 
sum, they made the case for “absolute[] immun[ity] from claims that 
they introduced perjured testimony . . . [as] [s]uch claims go to the 
heart of a prosecutor’s function as an advocate for the state in judicial 
proceedings.”148 
In opposing the appeal, Harrington and McGhee both disputed 
the claim of a circuit split and distinguished Buckley as involving a 
different situation—one in which one group of prosecutors coerced 
 
140.  McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 475 F. Supp. 862, 927 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
141.  McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932 (citation omitted). 
142.  Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee at 6, Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. 
McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March 17, 2009).  Accord Brief in Opposition for Respondent 
Harrington at 10, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March 17, 2009). 
143.  Brief of Petitioner at i, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. July 13, 2009). 
144.  See Petitioner’s Reply to Brief in Opposition at 11, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March 
31, 2009). (“Petitioners consistently have maintained that even if the alleged facts were true, 
respondents’ claims must fail because petitioners are immune as a matter of law.”). 
145.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994). 
146.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 143, at 2–3. 
147.  See id. at 7–8 and 34–36 (discussing cases). 
148.  Id. at 5. 
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false testimony, while another group of prosecutors used that 
testimony at trial.149 Furthermore, both argued that the Eighth Circuit 
properly applied the functional test in reaching prosecutors’ actions 
taken outside the advocatory functions (e.g. the procurement of false 
testimony and the introduction of said testimony at trial).150 McGhee 
also argued that relief must be available in cases like this to deter 
prosecutorial misconduct, or prosecutors would be “free to fabricate 
evidence during criminal investigations because they would know 
there was virtually no possibility of ever being punished for it.”151 
To be sure, strong protections are accorded to prosecutorial 
immunity, and for good reason.152 Yet, cases like this expose areas of 
potential prosecutorial abuse and have led some commentators to 
argue against absolute immunity.153 The McGhee case also illustrates 
another example of the role that attorney codes of conduct should 
play. Even if the Court determines that fabrication of evidence and 
use of that evidence at trial does not rise to the level of a claim here, 
there is no question that these allegations ought to be addressed by 
the attorney discipline system and ethical conduct codes.154 Last, 
McGhee exemplifies a common thread among all of these pending 
cases in that it demands guidance about the role and responsibilities 
of an attorney balanced against the rights of the client or defendant. 
 
149.  Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 16–17; Brief in 
Opposition for Respondent Harrington, supra note 142, at 12–14. 
150.  Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 9–10, Brief in 
Opposition for Respondent Harrington, supra note 142, at 13–14. 
151.  Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 19. 
152.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent 
Developments, 24 TOURO L. REV. 473 (2008) (discussing principles of absolute immunity and 
qualified immunity when government officials are sued for money damages). 
153.  See, e.g., Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present 
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 
1135, 1138 (1996) (arguing for the end of absolute immunity so that “incompetent or malevolent 
prosecutors [may be] subject to civil liability for their misdeeds”). 
154.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8 (2009) (requiring prosecutors to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and to “remedy” a conviction upon awareness that 
the defendant did not commit the crime); Iowa S. Ct. R. 32.3.8(a) (prohibiting prosecution of a 
charge prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause); Iowa S. Ct. R. 32.3.8(d) 
(prohibiting a prosecutor from knowingly failing to disclose exculpatory evidence). See also 
Brief for the Nat. Assoc. Ass’t U.S. Atty’s. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. July 20, 2009) (“[P]rosecutors who 
engage in misconduct are already subject to discipline by a variety of institutions, state bar 
associations, and the judges before whom they appear. In the most extreme cases, prosecutors 
may face criminal sanctions for their misconduct.”). 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
During a typical term the Supreme Court hears perhaps one,155 
two,156 or maybe three157 cases addressing issues related to the role of 
an attorney or the practice of law, or sometimes none at all.158 To date, 
ten cases have been granted review by the Court and even more may 
be added before the term concludes.159 Not only is the number of 
cases in this category unusual,160 but also the questions presented by 
all of the cases encompass core facets of the law of lawyering. Thus, 
the placement of these matters on the Supreme Court’s docket is 
remarkable both for the quantity of cases and their substance. Each 
case individually addresses issues that have the potential to 
substantially alter the day-to-day practice of law for attorneys in a 
variety of settings. Viewing the matters collectively exposes their 
interconnections and the dramatic impact that their outcomes may 
have on the Supreme Court’s legal profession jurisprudence.  
Attorneys, along with their clients, will want to follow the Court’s 
rulings closely. 
 
155.  For example, during the 2006–2007 term, the Court heard only one case addressing 
matters related to attorneys and the practice of law: Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007) (attorneys’ fees). See Survey of Supreme Court Cases 
Containing a Legal Ethics Issue from the 1998–1999 Term to Present (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). It should be noted for purposes of this essay that cases involving regulation 
of the judiciary or judicial misconduct have been excluded. 
156.  For example, during the 1998–1999 term, the Court heard two cases related to 
attorneys and the practice of law: Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999) (addressing attorneys’ 
fees); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999) (addressing prosecutorial misconduct). 
157.  For example, during the 2003–2004 term, the Court heard three cases involving 
attorneys and the practice of law: Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (addressing ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (addressing attorneys’ fees); 
and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (addressing prosecutorial misconduct). With the 
exception of the current 2009–2010 term, three cases are the most appearing on any Supreme 
Court docket since at least the 1998–1999 term, and likely previous terms. See Survey, supra 
note 155. 
158.  For example, during the 2005–2006 term, the Court heard no cases central to the role 
of an attorney or the practice of law. See Findlaw 2005–2006 Supreme Court Case Index, 
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/caseindex2005.html (listing cases heard during the 
2005–2006 term). 
159.  The standard practice of the Supreme Court is to continue adding cases for review at 
least until January of the current term. 
160.  See supra notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
